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FIRST AMENDMENT-CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF ACCESS TO CRIMINAL
TRIALS
Richmond Newspapers, Inc., v. Virginia, 100 S. Ct. 2814 (1980).
In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,' the Su-
preme Court resolved the question left undecided
in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,2 whether the Constitu-
tion guarantees a right of the public and the press
to attend criminal trials.3 In Gannett, the Court
found that the sixth amendment protection of a
right to a public trial4 was personal to the accused
and did not grant the public a right to attend
trials.s However, the ambiguous language in the
Court's opinion and the variety of approaches
suggested in the concurring opinions left the ques-
tion whether the public had any constitutional
right to attend criminal trials unclear.6 The uncer-
tainty was put to rest by the Richmond Newspapers
decision, in which the Court held that the press
and the public do have a first amendment right of
access to criminal trials.7 As a result of the decision,
however, further uncertainty arises as to the extent
of the right of access recognized in Richmond News-
papers.
8
100 S. Ct. 2814 (1980).
2 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
3 Chief Justice Burger phrased the question presented
in Richmond Newspapers as "whether the right of the public
and press to attend criminal trials is guaranteed under
the United States Constitution." 100 S. Ct. at 2818. The
question was not answered in Gannett because the plural-
ity opinion in that case had limited its holding to finding
that there was no right to attend pretrial hearings under
the sixth amendment. 443 U.S. at 391.4 U.S. CONsr. amend. VI provides in pertinent part:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial...
5 443 U.S. at 391.
6 An example of the variety of approaches taken by
members of the Court in Gannett, is Justice Stewart's
refusal to address the issue of whether there was a first
amendment right of access to pretrial hearings because
he found that even if there was such a right, the trial
judge had given it sufficient consideration. 443 U.S. at
392. In contrast, Justice Powell, while concurring in
Stewart's opinion, found that there was a first amend-
ment right of access to pretrial hearings which was satis-
fied by the trial judge's approach to the closure order.
443 U.S. at 401-02. Justice Rehnquist, while concurring
injustice Stewart's opinion, found that there was no first
amendment right of access to pretrial hearings. 443 U.S.
at 404.
7 100 S. Ct. at 2829.
8 The uncertainty results from the differences in the
I
The Supreme Court's opinion in Gannett Co. v.
DePasquale was noted for the confusion which it
caused.9 The issue in Gannett, as stated by Justice
Stewart in his majority opinion, was "whether
members of the public have an independent con-
stitutional right to insist upon access to a pretrial
judicial proceeding, even though the accused, the
prosecutor, and the trial judge all have agreed to
the closure of that proceeding in order to assure a
fair trial."10 Stewart found that the sixth amend-
ment right to a public trial was personal to the
accused and did not grant the public a right to
attend pretrial hearings." In stating his holding,
however, he wrote that the public had no right to
attend criminal trials under the sixth amendment.
1 2
This language left obvious questions as to the scope
of the holding. Chief Justice Burger, while joining
in the Stewart opinion, wrote a separate concurring
opinion in which he stressed that the holding was
limited to pretrial hearings. 13 However, he was the
only Justice limiting the opinion in that way, so
the questions as to its scope remained unanswered.
In addition to the confusion resulting from Stew-
art's treatment of the sixth amendment issue, un-
certainty was caused by his failure to analyze the
first amendment issue. He specifically refused to
approaches suggested by ChiefJustice Burger and Justice
Brennan. Burger would limit the right of access to places
traditionally open to the public, id. at 2828, while Bren-
nan would apply a balancing test in determining whether
to allow access in an individual case. Id. at 2834.
9 See, e.g., Goodale, Gannett Means What It Says; But Who
Knows What It Says?, Nat'l L. J., Oct. 15, 1979, at 20;
Stephenson, Fair Trial-Free Press: Rights in Continuing Con-
flict, 46 BROOKLYN L. REV. 39, 63 (1979) ("intended reach
of the majority opinion is unclear" (footnote omitted));
Note, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term, 93 HARv. L. REv. 60,
62 (1979) ("fragmentation of the Court and the ambi-
guities of the opinion leave the scope of the holding.
extraordinarily uncertain").
1 443 U.S. 368, 370 (1979).
" Id. at 381.
12Id. at 391. "[W]e hold that members of the public
have no constitutional right under the Sixth and Four-
teenth Amendments to attend criminal trials." Id
13 Id. at 394-96.
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decide whether there was a first amendment right
of access to pretrial hearings, 14 yet as one commen-
tator noted, "he implicitly defined the outer limit
of that putative right by ruling that, in any event,
the trial court had adequately taken first amend-
ment concerns into account by balancing the com-
peting interests at stake."' 5 Justice Powell, while
concurring in the majority opinion, addressed the
first amendment issue in a separate opinion. He
found that there was a first amendment right of
access to pretrial hearings, but he believed that this
right was satisfied by the trial court's consideration
of the conflicting values in its decision to close the
pretrial hearing.a6 justice Rehnquist also concurred
in the majority opinion, but he wrote separately to
indicate that he believed that there was no first
amendment right of access to pretrial hearings.'
7
Justice Blackmun dissented from the majority
and was joined by Justices Brennan, White, and
Marshall. He reserved the first amendment issue'
s
because he found that there was a public right of
access protected by the sixth amendment.' 9
14 1d. at 392.
15 Note, supra note 9, at 63. At the hearing on the
objections to the closure order the trial judge had recog-
nized that the press had a right of access but he found
that the defendant's right to a fair trial outweighed that
right. 443 U.S. at 393. By finding that the trial court's
action made it unnecessary to consider whether a first
amendment right of access to a pretrial hearing existed,
Stewart was implicitly holding that if there was a first
amendment right of access, its scope would be determined
by balancing the right against the competing interests in
closure.
16 443 U.S. at 403. Justice Powell found the right of
access to criminal trials in the first amendment "[blecause
of the importance of the public's having accurate infor-
mation concerning the operation of its criminal justice
system." Id. at 397. He argued that a trial court should
balance the public right of access to information about
its courts against the defendant's right to a fair trial,
when considering a closure request. When engaging in
that balancing process, the court should consider whether
there are alternative means to insure the fairness of the
trial. Id. at 400. Justice Powell also argued that the press
and public should be given a reasonable opportunity to
be heard before a closure order is put into effect. Id. at
40 1. Since the trial court held such a hearing and engaged
in such a balancing process, Justice Powell found that
the first amendment was satisfied. Id. at 408.
1
7
Id. at 404. Because he found that there was no
constitutional right of access to attend pretrial hearings,
Justice Rehnquist argued that the state courts were free
to determine for themselves whether to open or close a
hearing. Id. at 405.
'8 Id. at 447.
'9 Id. Justice Blackmun argued that although the sixth
amendment guaranteed the accused a right to a public
trial, this did not carry with it the right to insist on a
private proceeding. Id. at 418. He further argued that
Against this background of uncertainty about
the Gannett decision, the Supreme Court addressed
the issue of whether the Constitution granted the
public a right of access to criminal trials in Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia. On September 11, 1978,
Stevenson was tried for murder for the fourth
time.2° His first trial resulted in a conviction which
was overturned by the Virginia Supreme Court
because a bloodstained shirt had been improperly
admitted into evidence. 2' The second trial ended
in a mistrial when a juror asked to be excused and
no alternate juror was available. 22 The third trial
also ended hi a mistrial when it was discovered
that a prospective juror had read about the case in
a newspaper and had told prospective jurors about
it.2
Before the fourth trial began, counsel for the
defendant Stevenson moved to have the public
excluded from the courtroom because he was afraid
that a member of the murder victim's family who
had been in the courtroom before would inform
certain witnesses about the testimony of other wit-
nesses.24 After determining that the prosecutor had
no objections to the motion, the judge indicated
that Virginia Code § 19.2-226 gave him the discre-
tion to clear the courtroom,25 and he ordered it
cleared of all persons except witnesses who were
testifying.26 The reporters from the appellant news-
paper in the courtroom apparently did not object
to the order at the time it was issued, but later in
since the sixth amendment protected the public interest
in open trials, a defendant must assert an independent
constitutional right to support his claim for private pro-
ceedings. Since Justice Blackmun could find no such
independent right, he found that trials should be open.
Id. at 418-27. Justice Blackmun recognized that the
defendant's right to a fair trial might require the pro-
ceeding to be closed, but he would allow a closure only
when the defendant could show that irreparable damage
would occur by holding an open proceeding, that no
alternatives to closure would protect his right of a fair
trial, and that closure would be effective in protecting his
right to a fair trial. Id. at 441-42.
20 I00 S. Ct. at 2818.
"1 Stevenson v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 462, 466, 237
S.E.2d 779, 782 (1977).
22 100 S. Ct. at 2818.
2Id.
2
4 Id. at 2819.
' VA. CODE § 19.2-266 (1975) provides in pertinent
part:
In the trial of all criminal cases, whether the same
be felony or misdemeanor cases, the court may, in
its discretion, exclude from the trial any persons
whose presence would impair the conduct of a fair
trial, provided that the right of the accused to a
public trial shall not be violated.
100 S. Ct. at 2819.
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the same day they sought a hearing on a motion to
vacate the closure order.27 The trial judge granted
the hearing but denied the motion to vacate the
closure order.28 On the next day, Stevenson was
found not guilty and was released.29
Richmond Newspapers petitioned the Virginia
Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus and filed
an appeal of the trial judge's closure order30 The
court dismissed the mandamus petition and denied
appeal. The newspaper then appealed to the
United States Supreme Court.
II
The Supreme Court31 reversed the decision of
the Virginia Supreme Court. Chief Justice Burger
wrote the plurality opinion, beginning his analysis
with a review of the history of the jury trial from
the time of the Norman Conquest through the
history of the American Colonies. 32 Based on this
review of history, the Chief Justice concluded that
trials had always been presumed to be open to the
public.s He observed that there were several good
reasons for allowing the public to be present at
trials. Open trials helped assure members of the
community of the fairness of the proceedings since
they could be present to witness it.4 Open trials
also discouraged witnesses from commiting perjury
because they were aware that their neighbors might
hear their testimony and be able to contradict it."
Furthermore, open trials discouraged the miscon-
duct of participants and helped to prevent biased
decisionmaking.36 Finally, Burger noted that open
trials had a therapeutic effect on the community
since the members of the community could vent
their shared feelings of outrage by watching justice
being done.37 Based on the history of open trials
2 id.
2 14. at 2820.
29id.
'o Id.
3 1 Justice Powell did not participate in the decision. I'd.
at 2830.
32 Id. at 2821-23.
' Id. at 2823. "Ihe historical evidence demonstrates
conclusively that at the time when our organic laws were
adopted, criminal trials both here and in England had
long been presumptively open." It.34Id.
35 id.36 id
37 Id. at 2824-25. Chief Justice Burger warned that
"[W]ithout an awareness that society's responses to crim-
inal conduct are underway, natural human reactions of
outrage and protest are frustrated and may manifest
themselves in some form of vengeful 'self help.'" Id at
2824.
and the policy reasons for the practice, Burger
found a presumption that criminal trials were open
to the public.s8
Significantly, in his analysis of the constitutional
support for the right to attend criminal trials, Chief
Justice Burger indicated that the right was not
limited to trials, but extended to all places which
had traditionally been open to the public.39 In.
attempting to demonstrate constitutional support
for this right, Chief Justice Burger first relied on
the first amendment protection of freedom of
speech and press.4° Noting that the Court had
recognized that the first amendment protected the
right to receive information as well as the right of
self expression,4' the Chief Justice reasoned that in
the context of criminal trials this right to receive
information meant that the government could not
exclude the public from criminal trials summar-
ily.4 He further concluded that the freedom to
speak about events such as criminal trials must also
provide some protection for attending those events
because members of the public would be unable to
discuss the events without attending them.4
Chief Justice Burger found additional support
for the right of access to places traditionally open
to the public in the first amendment protection of
the right of assembly." Observing that the public
'3id. at 2825. "From this unbroken, uncontradicted
history, supported by reasons as valid today as in centu-
ries past, we are bound to conclude that a presumption
of openness inheres in the very nature of a criminal trial
under our system ofjustice."
9Id. at 2828.
4 U.S. CoNsr. amend. I provides in pertinent part:
"Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom
of s peech, or of the press ......4 Chief Justice Burger relied on First National Bank
v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978), and Kleindienst v. Man-
del, 408 U.S. 753 (1972), for the proposition that the
public had a right to receive information. In Bellotti, the
Court struck down a statute which prohibited corpora-
tions from spending money to publicize their views and
influence voters because the statute violated the right of
expression. In Mandel, the Court refused to order the
Attorney General to grant a visa to enter the United
States to a Marxist journalist, because the Court found
that the right to deny access to aliens was inherent in the
sovereignty of a government. The question of whether
these two cases support Chief Justice Burger's argument
is the subject of the discussion in the text accompanying
notes 104-15 infira.
42 100 S. Ct. at 2827.
43 Id. "The explicit, guaranteed rights to speak and to
publish concerning what takes place at a criminal trial
would lose much meaning if access to observe the trial
could, as it was here, be foreclosed arbitrarily." Id
44 U.S. CONsT. amend. I provides in pertinent part:
"Congress shall make no law.. abridging... the right
of the people peaceably to assemble ......
1980]
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had a right to assemble in public places such as
streets and sidewalks, he asserted that the trial
courtroom was a similar public place where people
had a right to assemble. 45
In response to the state's argument that there
was no public right of access to criminal trials
because the Constitution did not spell out such a
right, Chief Justice Burger pointed out that the
Court had frequently found that "fundamental
rights, even though not expressly guaranteed, have
been recognized by the Court as indispensible to
the enjoyment of rights explicitly defined. 4 6
Burger concluded that the right to attend criminal
trials was implicit in the first amendment because
without the right certain aspects of freedom of
speech would be infringed.4 7
After holding that the public had a first amend-
ment right of access to places traditionally open to
the public, Chief Justice Burger found that the
closure order of the trial judge violated that right
because the record was devoid of any countervail-
ing interest which would outweigh the first amend-
ment interest and because the judge failed to con-
sider any less restrictive alternatives to the closure
order.'8 Chief Justice Burger held that because of
the first amendment right of access to criminal
trials, a courtroom could not be closed "[a]bsent
an overriding interest articulated in findings,,
49
but he failed to give an example of what an
overriding interest might be.no
45 100 S. Ct. at 2828. The validity of this argument is
discussed in the text accompanying notes 116-19 infra.
46 100 S. Ct. at 2829. As examples of cases where the
Court had recognized certain rights as fundamental even
though they were not enumerated in the Constitution,
Chief Justice Burger cited Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S.
478 (1978) and Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976)
(recognizing the right to be presumed innocent); In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (right to a requirement of
a standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt); Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) and United States v.
Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966) (right to interstate travel);
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) and Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to privacy); and
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (right of
association).
471 00 S. Ct. at 2829. Chief Justice Burger did not
explain in what way the right of free speech would be
damaged, but it is likely that he was referring back to his
argument that the right to discuss information was with-
out value if there was no access to the information. See id.
at 2827.
4 Id. at 2829-30.
49 Id. at 2830.
50 Although Chief Justice Burger gave no examples as
to what an overriding interest might be, a discussion
about what may have been intended is found in the text
accompanying notes 139-46 infra.
Justice White concurred in the plurality opinion,
but stated that the opinion would have been un-
necessary if the Court in Gannett had recognized a
right of access to criminal trials in the sixth amend-
ment.5 ' White's comment is explained by the fact
that he had concurred in Justice Blackmun's opin-
ion 52 in Gannett, where Blackmun had argued that
the public's interest in an open trial gave it a right
of access protected by the sixth amendment.53
Justice Stevens also concurred in Chief Justice
Burger's opinion, but he wrote separately and at-
tempted to extend the holding by claiming that it
prohibited arbitrary interference with access to
important information. 5' Justice Stevens' restate-
ment of the holding suggested that arbitrary inter-
ference with any important information is pro-
hibited, whereas the holding only prohibited arbi-
trary interference with information or places that
had been "traditionally open to the public.ss
Since Burger was careful to limit the right of access
to places or information where access had histori-
cally been given, there is no support in his opinion
for Justice Stevens' extension.
Justice Brennan concurred only in the judge-
ment of the Court and wrote a separate opinion in
which Justice Marshall joined. Justice Brennan
introduced a framework for determining when the
public had a right of access to any governmental
information, not merely a right of access to infor-
mation or places traditionally open to the public.
5 7
He argued that the first amendment had the struc-
tural role in a republican government of ensuring
informed public debate, which is essential to the
survival of a republican government.5s In order for
public discussion to be informed, Justice Brennan
argued a right of access to governmental informa-
tion must be recognized.59 Acknowledging that his
analysis could lead to a right of access that was
"theoretically endless," Justice Brennan proposed
a balancing test for determining its scope.rn In his
words, "[a]n assertion of the prerogative to gather
5' 100 S. Ct. at 2830.
52 Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. at 406.
5 Id. at 433. See also note 19 supra and accompanying
text.
s4 100 S. Ct. at 2831.
55Id. at 2828.
56id.
57 Id. at 2833.
m A discussion of whether two of the cases which
Brennan relied upon support his argument that the first
amendment has a structural role to play can be found in
the text accompanying notes 130-33 infra.
0 100 S. Ct. at 2833.
6 Id.
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information must accordingly be assayed by con-
sidering the information sought and the opposing
interests invaded. '1 Justice Brennan stated two
principles to be used in applying his test. First, the
case for access would be stronger if the particular
proceeding or information for which access was
sought had been open to the public historically.'
Second, the access sought had to have specific
value.
63
In applying his test to the case before the Court,
Justice Brennan found that criminal trials had
been open to the public historically.' Moreover,
he found that keeping trials open satisfied the
appearance ofjustice, placed a check on the abuse
of judicial power, and ensured accurate fact-find-
ing.65 Based on this balancing test, Brennan found
that the scales were tipped in favor of keeping trials
open.66 He refused to consider what interest might
be sufficiently compelling to reverse the presump-
tion of openness because he found the Virginia
statute unconstitutional on its face67 because it
allowed judges to close trials at their discretion
without requiring them to consider the first amend-
ment interest.
6 8
While concurring in the judgment of the Court,
Justice Stewart wrote a separate opinion in which
he argued that the first amendment right to attend
criminal trials was not absolute. Justice Stewart
pointed out that a trial judge may impose reason-
able limitations upon the openness of the court-
room.69 As examples of such limitations, Justice
Stewart suggested that a trial judge might be re-
quired to exclude people from the courtroom in
order to preserve order, or because of a finite
seating capacity.70
Justice Blackmun also concurred in the judg-
ment of the Court but wrote a separate opinion.
Justice Blackmun remained convinced, as he was
in Gannett,71 that the sixth amendment was the
61Id. at 2834.
6 Id. Brennan argued historical practice should be
given weight because the Constitution carries the gloss of
history and because a tradition of accessibility suggested
that experience showed that accessibility was beneficial.
Id.
63 Id. Justice Brennan argued that the crucial question
was whether allowing access to a particular governmental
process had specific value for that process. Id.
r Id at 2834-36.
r Id. at 2837-38.
66 Id. at 2839.
6 Id.
6 Id.
69 Id. at 2840.
70id.
71 Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. at 433.
source of the public's right to attend a criminal
trial.72 While observing that the approach followed
by the plurality was troublesome, he refused to
state his reasons for believing why that was the
ase.73 As an example of the difficulties that re-
sulted from relying on sources other than the sixth
amendment for the right of access, Justice Black-
mun pointed to the uncertainty as to the standard
of closure which the Court adopted.74 While per-
ferring his sixth amendment analysis articulated in
Gannett, Justice Blackmun indicated that, as a sec-
ondary position, he accepted the argument that
the first amendment provided the public with the
right of access to criminal trials.
7 5
The lone dissent in Richmond Newspapers was that
ofJustice Rehnquist. Relying on the reasons stated
in his concurring opinion in Gannett,76 he could find
no right of access to criminal trials in the first
amendment. 77 Justice Rehnquist argued that the
Court was reserving to itself all ultimate decision-
making power over how justice should be admin-
istered in the the states by an overly expansive
reading of the fourteenth amendment, and warned
that this trend was unhealthy.78 Justice Rehnquist
concluded that the issue in the case before the
Court was not the existence of a right of access, but
whether the Court could review a decision of the
state's highest court regarding a matter within the
sovereien power of the state.79
III
The Supreme Court's decision in Richmond News-
papers significantly extended first amendment doc-
trine by recognizing the existence of a first amend-
ment right of access for the first time. While the
Court has consistently recognized that the first
amendment provided citizens with a right of
expressiona° and a right to receive information,8' it
7 100 S. Ct. at 2824.
73id.
74 1d. The uncertainty arose, according to Justice
Blackmun, because the plurality opinion required an
"overriding interest" for closure while Justice Stewart
allowed for "reasonable limitations!' and Justice Brennan
adopted an entirely separate- framework. In addition,
Blackmun noted that Justice Powell in Gannett had been
critical of Justices who concluded that closure was au-
thorized only when "strictly and inescapably necessary"
by relying on the sixth amendment. Id. (quoting Gannett
Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 339-40).
75 100 S. Ct. at 2842.
7 Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. at 403-08.
7 100 S. Ct. at 2843.
78id.
7 Id. at 2844.
' See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S.
539, 570 (1976) (holding a judge's order prohibiting the
1980]
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has never ruled in favor of a party asserting a right
of access.8 2 An examination of previous first amend-
ment decisions demonstrates, however, that in
denying the claims of parties asserting a right of
access, the Court has never excluded the possibility
that the right existed. Consequently, the Richmond
Newspapers decision can be reconciled with prior
case law.
In Zemel v. Rusks an individual challenged the
Secretary of State's refusal to issue him a passport
to Cuba on the grounds that the Secretary's action
deprived him of his first amendment right of access
to information about other countries.84 In affirming
the court of appeals decision in favor of the Secre-
tary, the Court rejected the argument that a first
amendment right was involved and held that
"[t]he right to speak and publish does not carry
with it the unrestrained right to gather informa-
tion.
" 5
press from publishing accounts of an accused's confession
was invalid because there was not a showing of need
sufficient to overcome the presumption against prior
restraints imposed by the first amendment guarantee of
freedom of expression); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964) (recognizing that "[tihe general
proposition that freedom of expression upon public ques-
tions is secured by the First Amendment has long been
settled by our decisions" and holding that because of this
freedom of expression an individual could not be held
liable for damages in a libel action brought by a public
official unless malicious intent was shown).
s See, e.g., Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citi-
zens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976) (rec-
ognizing that "[ilf there is a right to advertise, there is a
reciprocal right to receive the advertising," and holding
that a state could not prohibit pharmacists from adver-
tising the price of prescription drugs); Stanley v. Georgia,
394 U.S. at 568 (recognizing that "[i]t is now well estab-
lished that the Constitution protects the right to receive
information and ideas," and holding invalid a Georgia
statute which made possession of obscene materials a
crime because it violated this right); Lamont v. Postmas-
ter General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965) (holding that a statute
which required an individual to notify the post office if
he desired to receive communist literature addressed to
him violated the first amendment).
8 100 S. Ct. at 2830. Justice Stevens recognized this
and, emphasizing'the extension of first amendment doc-
trine, wrote, "Today, however,for thefirst time, the Court
unequivocally holds that an arbitrary interference with
access to important information is an abridgement of the
freedoms ofspeech and of the press protected by the First
Amendment." Id. at 2831 (emphasis added).
8"38 1 U.S. 1 (1965).
84 Id. at 16. The appellant also challenged the action
on the grounds that it exceeded the scope of authority
granted by the Passport Act of 1962, that it violated his
right to liberty under the due process clause, and on the
grounds that the Passport Act contained indefinite stan-
dards for travel controls. The Court rejected all of these
claims. Id. at 7-18.85 d. at 17.
The Court in Zemel did not address the question
of whether any right of access to information ex-
isted, but rather, limited the holding to a finding
that there was no unrestrained right of access. This
holding can be reconciled with the holding in
Richmond Newspapers, since both Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Brennan also found that the
right of access was not unrestrained. Under Chief
Justice Burger's analysis, the right did not exist
unless. it had been recognized historically,8
whereas underJustice Brennan's analysis, the right
did not exist unless the benefits of permitting access
outweighed any countervailing interest.87
Justice Brennan distinguished Zemel as a case
where the interests in security and confidentiality
outweighed the interests in allowing access."i This
distinction is appropriate since the Court in Zemel
emphasized that the Secretary's action wasjustified
by national security considerations.89 Chief Justice
Burger did not attempt to distinguish Zemel, yet his
analysis indicates that a citizen did not tradition-
ally have a right of access to a hostile country such
as Cuba. This argument had' support in the Zeme!
opinion, since the Court indicated in that case that
it would give weight to the fact that the Depart-
ment of State had traditionally viewed itself as
having the authority to deny passports to certain
hostile countries. 9° Under the analysis of either
Chief Justice Burger or Justice Brennan, Richmond
Newspapers can be reconciled with the Zemel deci-
sion.
Two related cases where the claims of parties to
a right of access were denied are Pell v. Procunier9'
and Saxbe v. Washington Post Co. 92 In Pell, three
journalists argued that a California prison regula-
tion which prohibited face to face interviews of
prisoners by members of the press violated their
right of access to information guaranteed by the
first and fourteenth amendments.9 3 In Saxbe, the
Washington Post Company challenged a similar
regulation adopted by the Federal Bureau of
Prisons. In denying both claims, the Court found
8 100 S. Ct. at 2828.
87 Id. at 2834 (Brennan, J., concurring).
8 Id. at 2833.
89 381 U.S. at 14-15.
90Id. at 8-11.
9i 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
9241 7 U.S. 843 (1974).
9 In Pell, several inmates also challenged the regula-
tion, arguing that it violated their first amendment right
of expression. The Court rejected their claim because it
found that prisoners only maintained those first amend-
ment rights which were not inconsistent with the pris-
oners' status and the regulation's restriction on those
rights was justified by the state's interest in maintaining
order in the prison. 417 U.S. at 822-24.
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that members of the press had no right of access to
information beyond that which was granted to
members of the public generally.9 Because the
members of the public were afforded a right of
access to the prison for tours and visits with rela-
tives,95 the Court did not address the question of
whether the members of the public had a right of
access.
Because the Court did not address the question
of whether a right of access existed in Pell and
Saxbe, those cases are of questionable relevance to
the Richmond Newspapers decision. Yet, in denying
the members of the press a right of access to the
prisoners for interviews, the Court may have been
denying that right to members of the public gen-
erally. To the extent the cases can be read in that
way, they can be distinguished from the Richmond
Newspapers decision. In his opinion, Chief Justice
Burger distinguished Pell and Saxbe on the grounds
that they involved questions of access to penal
institutions which were not places traditionally
open to public access.9 Nothing in the Pell and
Saxbe opinions, however, indicates that those deci-
sions turned on the fact that penal institutions were
traditionally closed. Justice Brennan distinguished
Pell and Saxbe on the grounds that the governmen-
tal interests in security at the prision outweighed
the reasons for allowing access.97 This distinction is
supported since the Court in Pell stressed the fact
that the regulation limiting interviews was neces-
sary to preserve prison security.98 Under either
analysis, however, the Richmond Newspapers decision
can be reconciled with the decisions in Pell and
Saxbe.
In a case factually similar to Pell and Saxbe,
Houchins v. KQED,' the Court faced a radio and
television broadcasting company's claim that it
had been denied its first amendment right of access
by a sheriff who refused to allow reporters to
inspect the local jail except on regularly scheduled
tours which provided little access to the prisoners.
In denying the broadcasting company's claim, the
Court followed Pell and Saxbe and held that the
press had no right to any more access than was
granted to members of the public generally1 °
Richmond Newspapers can be reconciled with this
94See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. at 834; Saxbe v.
Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. at 850.
95 Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. at 822-24; Saxbe v.
Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. at 849.
96 100 S. Ct. at 2827 n.ll.97 Id. at 2833 (Brennan, J., concurring).
'417 U.S. 822-24.
9 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
'0Id. at 16.
holding using the same analysis which was used for
reconciling Pell and Saxbe, since the holdings are
the same.101
As the preceding discussion demonstrates, pre-
vious first amendment cases where a right of access
was claimed did not deny the existence of the right.
The Court simply denied the claims raised on other
grounds without ever addressing the issue. How-
ever, in Richmond Newspapers, the Court extended
first amendment doctrine by addressing the issue
for the first time and finding that the right of access
did exist. In arriving at this result, however, Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Brennan qualified the
right in such a way that the decision can be
reconciled with previous cases.
IV
Because the decision in Richmond Newspapers was
the first instance in which the Court recognized a
first amendment right of access, the source of this
right and support for it in the Court's previous
decisions must be analyzed. This examination must
consider both Chief Justice Burger's approach and
Justice Brennan's approach, however, since neither
commanded a majority of the Court. Justice Bren-
nan's approach withstands academic scrutiny,
whereas the Chief Justice's opinion has some note-
worthy technical flaws.
Chief Justice Burger relied on three different
sources for the right of public access in his plurality
opinion.1 °2 He argued that the right could be im-
plied from the freedom of speech and press clause,
the right of assembly clause, and the ninth amend-
ment.' 3 Unfortunately, an examination of his
101 See text accompanying notes 96-98 supra. It should
be noted that while the holding in Houchins can be
reconciled with Richmond Newspapers, the dicta in the case
cannot be reconciled. In his plurality opinion in Houchins,
Chief Justice Burger stated that "Inleither the First
Amendment nor the Fourteenth Amendment mandates
a right of access to government information or sources of
information within the government's control." 438 U.S.
at 15. He was joined in that plurality opinion by Justices
White and Rehnquist. Since both Chief Justice Burger
and Justice White recognized a first amendment right of
access in Richmond Newspapers, 100 S. Ct. 2829-30, they
clearly shifted their positions.
Justice Stewart also shifted his position. In his opinion
concurring in the judgment in Houchins, he stated that
"[tihe First and Fourteenth Amendments do not guar-
antee the public a right of access to information generated
or controlled by government .... 438 U.S. at 16. How-
ever, in his opinion concurring in the judgment in Rich-
mond Newspapers, he agreed that the first and fourteenth
amendments gave the public a right of access to criminal
trials. 100 S. Ct. at 2840.
102 See text accompanying notes 39-46 supra.
103 100 S. Ct. at 2826-29.
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analysis of the three sources reveals that he relied
on cases which do not support his conclusions,
assumed conclusions in making his arguments, and
failed to satisfactorily develop his analysis.
The principal difficulty with Chief Justice
Burger's analysis of the freedom of speech and press
clause is that the cases he relied on do not support
his position. He quoted First National Bank of Boston
v. Bellotti"'4 for the proposition that government
could not limit the stock of information available
to the public,'0° and cited Kleindienst v. Mandel'°
for the proposition that there was a first amend-
ment right to receive information. 0 7 He based his
conclusion that the first amendment freedoms of
speech and press granted a right of access to places
that had traditionally been open to the public
upon these two propositions.108 Neither case which
he cited in building his argument, however, sug-
gested such a far reaching conclusion.
In Bellotti, the Court struck down a Massachu-
setts statute which prohibited certain business cor-
porations from spending money to publicize their
views in order to influence voters on election is-
sues.' °9 The Court invalidated the statute because
it abridged the corporations' freedom of expression,
not because it abridged the public's right of access
to information." 0 Although there was a public
right of access to information,"' that right had
always been limited to information transmitted by
a willing source." 2 That the public has a right to
information from an unwilling source certainly
does not follow automatically from the Court's
suggestion that the public has a right of access to
information from a source that is willing to exercise
its right of expression. Since Chief Justice Burger
failed to provide any explanation or support for
this significant logical leap, his reliance on Bellotti
makes his argument less than convincing.
Kleindienst v. Mandel provides no more support
for Chief Justice Bvrger's argument than Bellotti
does. In Mandel, several professors argued that they
had a first amendment right of access to informa-
tion from a Marxist journalist, which right was
being denied by the Attorney General's refusal to
'04 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
'0 100 S. Ct. at 2827.
'06 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
O 100 S. Ct. at 2827.
108Id.
109 408 U.S. at 795.
"
0 Id. at 776.
"' Id. at 783.
112 See Note, The Right To Attend Criminal Hearings, 78
COLUM. L. REv. 1308 (1978).
grant the journalist a visa to enter the United
States.13 In upholding the Attorney General's ac-
tion, the Court found that while there was a first
amendment right to receive information, 114 this
right did not outweigh the justification for exclu-
sion of aliens because the power to exclude aliens
was inherent in the sovereignty of the govern-
ment. 115 Thus, in Mandel the Court refused to grant
a right of access to information even though it
recognized a right to receive information. Yet Chief
Justice Burger relied on the decision to argue that
there was a right of access to a criminal trial which
flowed from the right to receive information. Since
he made no attempt to distinguish Mandel, or ex-
plain why the right of access flowed from the right
to receive information in Richmond Newspapers, his
conclusion that the freedoms of speech and press
granted a right to attend criminal trials is unsup-
ported.
Chief Justice Burger's argument that the right
of access to criminal trials is related to the first
amendment right of assembly is also questionable.
Burger stated that the trial courtroom was a public
place like a street or sidewalk, therefore people had
a right to assemble there." 6 But in making that
statement Chief Justice Burger assumed his conclu-
sion. A person's right to assemble in a public place
is necessarily predicated on the assumption that a
place is public in that any person has a right to be
present there. The issue in Richmond Newspapers was
whether the trial courtroom was a place where the
public had a right to be present. Only by assuming
that a courtroom was a public place was Burger
able to argue that people had a right to assemble
there.
Moreover, the issue in the right to assembly cases
was different from the issue in Richmond Newspapers.
For example, in Hague v. C.I.O.,1"7 cited by the
Chief Justice as recognizing a right of assembly,
the issue was whether ordinances which prohibited
the distribution of printed literature and meeting
in a public place without a permit violated the
Constitution. In other words, the issue in Hague
was not whether people had a right to be present in
the park, but rather what restrictions could be
placed on their activities once they were present
there." 8 Consequently, the holding in Hague was
408 U.S. at 762.
114 Id.
"'Id. at 765.
"6 100 S. Ct. at 2828.
"7 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
Id. at 512.
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that the first amendment right of assembly clause
guaranteed people a right to hold meetings and
discuss public questions in public places.119 The
Chief Justice cannot rely on a holding protecting
certain activities in public places to determine
whether a place is public. Since the issue in Rich-
mond Newspapers was whether the trial courtroom
was a place where the public had a right to be
present, the right of assembly cases are irrelevant.
Chief Justice Burger's analysis of the ninth
amendment, despite its validity, is insufficiently
developed. As Burger pointed out, the Court has
acknowledged that "certain unarticulated rights
are implicit in enumerated guarantees.'20 An ex-
ample is Griswold v. Connecticut,121 where the Court
found a right to privacy in the penumbras of
several constitutional guarantees. In his plurality
opinion in Griswold, Justice Douglas reviewed the
cases where peripheral rights had been held to be
within specific guarantees, and observed that,
"[wlithout those peripheral rights the specific rights
would be less secure."' 2 While ChiefJustice Burger
continually asserted that the freedoms of speech
and press would be less secure without the right to
attend criminal trials, 120 he never explained why a
transcript of a proceeding would be insufficient to
protect those rights, even though he acknowledged
that people seldom attended trials anymore and
that they merely read accounts of the trials in the
newspaper.124 Since he failed to adequately explain
why access to trials was necessary to protect specific
first amendment rights, his ninth amendment anal-
ysis suffers from a gap in its logic.
As the preceding discussion demonstrates, Chief
Justice Burger was unable to support his reliance
on the first, ninth, and fourteenth amendments as
the source of the right of access to public places. In
addition to the difficulties with Iiis analysis of the
source of the right, however, the test which Burger
suggested for recognizing the right is deficient be-
cause it fails to give sufficient weight to the values
served by allowing public access to information.
Burger indicated that he would limit the right of
access "to places traditionally open to the public,
igid at 515-16.
'20 100 S. Ct. at 2829. As examples of cases where such
rights have been recognized, see Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to privacy); NAACP v. Ala-
bama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (right of association).12 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
'
2 2 Id. at 482-83.
23 See 100 S. Ct. at 2827-29.
124 Id at 2825.
as criminal trials long have been. ' ' 25 The only issue
that Burger would consider in deciding whether to
grant the public access to a proceeding would be
the issue of whether the proceeding had been open
historically. This approach is inconsistent with
Burger's analysis of the source of the right in
Richmond Newspapers, for he was careful to point out
that allowing public access to criminal trials was
advantageous because "it gave assurance that the
proceedings were conducted fairly to all concerned,
and it discouraged perjury, the misconduct of par-
ticipants, and decisions based on secret bias or
partiality." 126 Ironically, Burger suggested a test
for recognition of the right of access which fails to
consider the values served by allowing access, while
a significant part of his development of the right
dealt with the values served by allowing access to
criminal trials.
Thus the substantial analytical difficulties of
Chief Justice Burger's opinion are attributable to
failure to provide convincing support for his anal-
ysis of the source of the first amendment right of
access, and the failure of the test he suggested to
consider the values afforded by allowing access. A
better approach to the origin of the right of access
and toward establishing a test for its recognition is
developed injustice Brennan's concurring opinion.
Justice Brennan found that the right of access
was implicit in the first amendment. He explained
that meaningful, informed discussion was necessary
in order for a republican form of government to
survive.127 The first amendment has a structural
role to play in ensuring the existence of conditions
necessary for that discussion.1 28 One of the condi-
tions necessary for informed discussion to take
place is access to information. Consequently, under
Brennan's analysis, a right of access to information
is guaranteed by the first amendent.12 9
Justice Brennan's view of the importance of free
discussion to a republican form of government has
been recognized by the Court in prior opinions. In
Stromberg v. California,10 striking down a California
statute which prohibited the display of a red flag
in a public place as a sign of opposition to orga-
nized government, the Court observed that:
'
25 Id. at 2828. This approach was suggested by at least
one commentator as a way to limit the scope of the right
of access. Note, supra note 9, at 69.
126 100 S. Ct. at 2823.
127 Id. at 2833 (Brennan, J., concurring).
1 28 id.
130 283 U.S. 359 (193 1).
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The maintenance of the opportunity for free political
discussion to the end that government may be re-
sponsive to the will of the people and that changes
may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity
essential to the security of the Republic, is a funda-
mental principal of our Constitutional systems.'
3 1
Similarly, in Grosjean v. American Press Co., 3 2 striking
down a tax imposed on those in the business of
selling advertisements in newspapers and maga-
zines, the Court stated:
The newspapers, magazines and other journals of
the country, it is safe to say, have shed and continue
to shed, more light on the public and business affairs
of the nation then any other instrument of publicity;
and since informed public opinion is the most potent
of all restraints upon misgovernment, the suppres-
sion or abridgement of the publicity afforded by the
free press cannot be regarded otherwise than with
grave concern.'-
As Stromberg and Grosjean demonstrate, the Court
has recognized the importance of meaningful dis-
cussion to a republican form of government. Con-
sequently, Justice Brennan's argument that the
first amendment has a structural role to play in
constitutional government is well supported.
Furthermore, in previous decisions the Court has
derived a specific right from the structure of gov-
ernment as Justice Brennan pointed out." For
example, in Reynolds v. Simst 35 the Court inferred a
fundamental right to vote from the nature of a
"free and democratic society" and the vote's im-
portance as a "preservative of all other rights." In
Griswold v. Connecticut,1 6 the Court inferred a right
of privacy from several constitutional guarantees.
Deriving a right of access to information from the
role of the first amendment in assuring informed
communication is an analogous approach which is
supported by Griswold and Sims.
131 Id. at 369.
'3 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
'33 Id. at 250.
'34 100 S. Ct. at 2833 n.4.
-"' 377 U.S. 533 (1964). In Reynolds, the Court upheld
a district court order of temporary reapportionment
which would be in effect until the legislature drew up its
own plan. The grounds for the order of reapportionment
was a finding that the proposed reapportionment scheme
of the legislature violated the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment because the number of citi-
zens in the districts varied, causing some citizens to have
greater representation than others in the legislature.
13 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). In Griswold, the Court
struck down a Connecticut statute which prohibited the
use of contraceptives because it was found to violate the
right to privacy. Id.
As the preceeding analysis demonstrates, Justice
Brennan's development of the source of the right
of access was more convincing and better supported
than Chief Justice Burger's rationale. The balanc-
ing test which Justice Brennan employed in defin-
ing the scope of the right of public access weighs
the values protected by the right, whereas Burger's
test fails to do so. Justice Brennan recognized that
his definition of a right of access was theoretically
unlimited in its scope. t37 His balancing test ad-
dressed that difficulty while remaining sensitive to
the values which the first amendment was designed
to protect in its structural role. Justice Brennan
recognized the importance of considering whether
the information or proceedings had been tradition-
ally open to the public, yet unlike the ChiefJustice,
he also required consideration of the values which
would be furthered by allowing access. 51 8 Informed
discussion is necessary for a democracy to survive,
hence an inquiry into the extent to which denying
access will hinder important informed discussion is
necessary. Limiting this inquiry to the question
whether access had been permitted historically is
inadequate to ensure that the values of informed
discussion will be protected because it fails to con-
sider those values.
V
Substantial differences exist between the ap-
proach taken by Chief Justice Burger and that
taken by Justice Brennan in analyzing the right of
access issue. Since neither commanded a majority,
the Court must still decide which approach to
adopt. In addition, the Court must determine the
standard to use in deciding when a right of access
can be infringed once the right is recognized. On
this latter question, however, the approaches of
ChiefJustice Burger and Justice Brennan are much
the same.
In his plurality opinion, Chief Justice Burger
held that a criminal trial must be open to the
public "[a]bsent an overriding interest articulated
in the findings."5 Justice Brennan refused to con-
sider what interests might be sufficiently compel-
ling to reverse the presumptidn of openness because
he found the Virginia statute unconstitutional on
its face.' 4° Brennan's compelling interest test ap-
pears similar to Burger's overriding interest test,
but the standards are difficult to compare because
neither gave an example of what a compelling or
overriding interest might be.
137 100 S. Ct. at 2834.
138Id.
9 Id. at 2830.
'40Id. at 2839.
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Some guidance as to what Chief Justice Burger
and Justice Brennan intended by their tests can be
found in Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart.141 In
Nebraska Press Association, the Court faced a chal-
lenge to a district court judge's restraining order
which prohibited the broadcast of confessions of an
accused in a murder case until after the jury was
impaneled.142 In striking down the order, the Court
held that it failed to meet the heavy burden that
must be met to justify prior restraint on freedom of
expression. 43 In order to overcome that burden,
the trial judge would have to demonstrate that,
because of its nature and extent, pretrial publicity
was likely to prevent the defendant's opportunity
for a fair trial, that other measures short of a
restraining order would be unlikely to mitigate the
effects of unrestrained publicity, and that a re-
straining order would be an effective mechanism
to prevent the harm caused by the publicity.'"
The test adopted in Nebraska Press Association to
deal with prior restraints is also applicable to de-
nials of access to information because both actions
infringe the freedom of expression. The newsman
who wishes to publish information about a trial is
deprived of his right of expression as much by
being denied his right of access to the information
he wishes to disseminate as he is by a court order
prohibiting him from publishing the information
he already has in his possession.14s Consequently,
141 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
142 Id. at 541.
1
4 3 Id. at 570.
'4 Id at 562.
145 The argument that denial of access to information
was the equivalent of a prior restraint was made prior to
the decision in Richmond Newspapers, but it was criticized
by at least one commentator because it assumed that the
person seeking access to the information had a right to it.
Since the right of access had not yet been recognized, the
the compelling or overriding interest that Justice
Brennan and Chief Justice Burger require should
be equivalent to the interest that must be shown in
order to justify prior restraints on the freedom of
the press. Therefore, denials of access to informa-
tion or proceedings to which a person has a right
of access should be permissible only upon a show-
ing that the nature and extent of publicity cause a
substantial danger of preventing a fair trial which
effect is unlikely to be mitigated by any measures
short of denial of access to the information sought,
and that denial of access to the information is likely
to prevent the danger.
146
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Richmond News-
papers established that the public does have a con-
stitutional right of access to criminal trials, settling
the confusion which resulted from Gannett v. De-
Pasquale. The question which remains, however, is
how far beyond the courtroom this right of access
will extend. The significance of the Richmond News-
papers decision remains uncertain, therefore, pend-
ing the majority's adoption of the approach of
either Chief Justice Burger or Justice Brennan.
Analytically sound, Justice Brennan's approach
offers the Court the opportunity to extend the right
of access to many other arguably public places, in
contrast to the Chief Justice's rigid historical ap-
proach which narrows the holding.
CRAIG H. LUBBEN
commentator found the argument of questionable merit.
See Note, supra note 112, at 1317-18. Since the Court
recognized this right of access to information in Richmond
Newspapers, the argument has new validity.
146 See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. at 562.
